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Introduction
Present goal of humans in the EU is to live at 
a safe space with development potential. Therefore, 
the basic function of the EU and its Member States 
is to provide the protection and development of the 
human society. The EU has been realizing so-called 
good governance. Within the 7th framework, a lot of 
research projects have been solved. The projects are 
focused on security and sustainable development of 
the area of interest. One of the projects is the project 
FOCUS. In this project there are predicted possible 
disaster scenarios focused on identifying possible 
situations in the area and on providing a level of 
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery 
so that the system of applied actions and activities 
would not lead to the safety reduction and could be 
realized in terms of knowledge and in fi nancial and 
technical terms. 
After the experience with several crises of 
different types in recent years, it is clear that the EU 
security concept and internal framework must change. 
They must cover not only the internal market but also 
other domains supporting the real economy and also 
systemic support for the European population. One of 
such aims is to build a safe community with suffi cient 
sustainability. The basic terms security and safety are 
defi ned by the following way: the security denotes 
the state of asset in which the harm origin probability 
is low; the safety denotes the set of anthropogenic 
measures and activities by which asset security is 
ensured (Nicholson et al., 2012, Procházková, 2008, 
Procházková, 2011a; Procházková, 2012; Rogers, 
2011).
Materials and methods
Data on disasters, disaster management are given 
in quoted materials. The synthesis of results derived 
by comprehensive approach from 15 different 
investigations (Procházková, 2011a-g) is described 
in following paragraph.
Groundwork
Based on current knowledge of human life, it is 
not enough to meet physiological needs. H. Maslow 
(1954) showed that there are further needs for safety 
and security, self-realization and social recognition. 
The fundamental orientation of research and state 
administration on the issues of security and safety 
and its management came after major terrorist 
attacks in the U.S. 11.09.2001, 11.3.2004 in Madrid, 
3.9.2004 in Beslan, 7.7.2005 in London, etc., after 
which mankind fully realized what security means 
for it and its development and what represents 
the highest value for it. Current knowledge and 
experience (Procházková, 2011b) shows that we 
know that in order to achieve the desired state of 
each system, i.e. including the human system, and 
for its development, it is important to set goals and 
procedures for achieving them, which are dependent 
on the resources, powers and means that are never 
suffi cient. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on 
priorities, and to manage resources, forces and 
means in time and space. In addition to all above, it 
is necessary to know the territory and its protected 
interests, possible disasters that threaten it, a way of 
threatening, available resources, sources of power 
and resources (Procházková, 2011a). Following 
paragraphs focus on the facts we need to know about 
the territory and the scope of details.
The knowledge base
A concept is a common feature or characteristic. 
Concepts are vital to the development of scientifi c 
knowledge. Concepts, as abstract units of meaning, 
play a key role in the development and testing of 
theories. The paper presents concept of the EU 
security as a schema containing both, the items 
and the data that are taken into account for the EU 
security. It contains vision on the EU security and 
on its provision. On the basis of assessment of data 
and fi ndings from professional publications, the list 
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of each is e.g. in book (Procházková, 2011a), the 
concept is compiled by application of comprehensive 
approach (Procházková, 2011c), aims and principles 
given in the UN concept HUMAN SYSTEM 
SAFETY (UN, 1994) and in the EU concept SAFE 
COMMUNITY (EU, 2012).
The evaluation of collected relevant data 
described above shows that the real security concept 
contains:
1. Present cognition of problems of safety, 
security and sustainable development and set of 
fi ndings on the EU management, i.e.: historical 
concepts and experience; management tools 
(co-ordination and responsibility matrices, 
fundamental functions of the EU, Member 
States, regional and local governments - public 
affairs management, private organisation 
affairs management, citizen education, specifi c 
education of technical and managerial workers, 
technical, health, environmental, cyber and other 
standards, norms and rules, inspections and 
audits, executive units for emergency situations 
coping, systems for coping the emergency and 
critical situations, security, emergency, continuity 
and crisis planning, research and development, 
science on safety and on human system security; 
safety management including measures and 
activities for ensuring the security and sustainable 
development; levels of safety management; data, 
information and knowledge; decision-making 
principles (phases, types and methods of decision-
making, decision-making on public assets, 
rules for decision-making and decision support 
systems); safety management system; programme 
for safety increasing; golden rules for safety 
management; groundwork’s for application of 
process management at safety management; and 
strategy and strategic management.
2. Terms (defi nition of security, safety, sustainable 
development, hazard, risk etc.).
3. Human system assets, i.e.: basic public assets; 
human system characteristics; and conclusions for 
safety management.
4. Reality that sources of disasters, i.e. phenomena 
that from some size can disrupt the EU security, 
are the results of fi ve different processes in human 
system (Procházková, 2011a), Figure 1. 
5. Description of disasters, emergencies and 
connections linked with management, i.e.: 
disasters (their causes, types, sizes, characteristics; 
summary of general fi ndings on disasters; and 
action of disasters on human system); emergencies 
(categories, category characteristics); human 
system vulnerabilities; and emergency defeat 
principles.
6. Rules for negotiation (trade-off) with risks, i.e.: 
problems connected with safety of assets; set of 
knowledge necessary for safety of assets; hazard 
and risk characteristics and determination; life 
with risks (partial, integrated and integral risk, 
analysis and assessment of risks; methods used at 
analysis and assessment of risks; risk acceptability, 
qualifi ed procedure for comparison of risks, 
processing the risk assessment results to form 
suitable for decision-making, risk assessment); 
risk management and safety management 
(risk engineering, security engineering, safety 
engineering, SoS safety engineering, risk 
management model, safety management model).
7. Relevant subsystems of the EU, Member States, 
regional and local governments for safety 
management and their support, i.e.: safety 
management stages; planning (demands, security 
planning, space planning, land-use planning, 
emergency, continuity and crisis planning, 
renewal planning); systems for decision support; 
and security documentation.
8. Selected aspects connected with safety and 
crisis management, i.e.: information transfer 
and communication principles; international 
co-operation; and humanitarian aid principles.
Fig. 1 Sources of disasters in the Human system 
(Procházková, 2011a)
Fig. 2 Human system public assets 
(Procházková, 2011a, d)
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9. Legislation of the EU and the Members States 
for safety management, territory development 
and crisis management, i.e.: basic legislation; 
special legislation for crisis management; and 
crisis management bodies.
10. Safety management system of the EU and the 
Member States, i.e. demands; structure and 
relevant elements (public administration, police, 
fi re-fi ghters, army, citizens).
In these parts, the concept of the EU security 
shall contain relevant knowledge and approaches as:
1. There is a set of human system public assets that 
are mutually dependent, Fig. 2 (Procházková, 
2011a, d).
2. There is a set of documented disasters 
(Procházková, 2011a, d); about 77 different types.
3. The disasters affect public assets by various ways, 
and therefore, the protection must be correctly 
directed (Procházková, 2011a, d).
4. At ensuring the human system asset protection, the 
All Hazard Approach is used [6]; it was accepted 
by the EU (Procházková, 2011a).
5. For safety management, the causal relationship 
„disaster - emergency“ is important, Fig. 3 
(Procházková, 2011a, d).
6. It is the reality that humans have limited 
possibilities in protection of public assets against 
disasters; they only contain them to certain size of 
disaster level that is marked by the term the design 
disaster (the protection is aimed to impacts of this 
size for each disaster type). If these levels are 
exceeded, the manifestation of interdependences 
starts, Fig. 4 (Procházková, 2011a, d). The special 
protection during the emergency is only planned 
and arranged for human lives and health and 
property (see national legislations).
Fig. 3 Relationship cause vs. consequence 
(Procházková, 2011 b, d)
7. The humans perform different measures and 
activities with the aim to cope with the disasters, 
Fig. 5 (Procházková, 2011a, d).
8. The EU security can be reached only by 
systematic, proactive and permanent effort 
correctly directed to important targets 
(Procházková, 2011a). 
9. The EU and its Member States have management 
of state (i.e. human system) with three levels, 
Fig. 6 (Procházková, 2011a, d).
Fig. 4 Extreme (beyond design) disaster impacts on 
public assets. Protection measures and activities are 
prepared only for impacts denoted by bold arrow. 
Secondary impacts are caused by cascade failures 
of infrastructures (Procházková, 2011b, d)
Fig. 5 Different measures and activities performed 
by humans with the aim to cope with the disasters 
(Procházková, 2011a)
 
10. The EU and its Member States have special 
legislation for safety management; example is 
given in Figure 7 (Procházková, 2011a, d).
11.  The methods of risk identifi cation, risk analysis, 
risk management and risk engineering depend 
on the following requirements (distinguished 
methods exist for: risk reduction in closed 
system only considering the technical causes of 
risks; risk reduction in closed system considering 
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technical and human factor causes of risks; 
ensuring the system security without respecting 
the system vicinity security; ensuring the system 
safety - system and its vicinity are safe; ensuring 
the system of systems (SoS) safety - overlapping 
systems and their vicinity are safe) (Procházková, 
2011a, d).
Fig. 6 Three level state (i.e. human system) 
management (Procházková, 2011c, d)
Fig. 7 Example of legislation structure for ensuring 
the safety in various situations that is in force in the 
Czech Republic (Procházková, 2011a, d)
Fig. 8 Model of risk management of territory 
(Procházková, 2011a, d, f)
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12. The EU can be the global security actor only if it 
respects principals of SoS safety in management 
of risks and in engineering disciplines 
implementing the measures and activities 
keeping the risk on acceptable level.
Fig. 9 Model of safety management of territory 
(RRD(i) - risk from i-th relevant disaster 
(Procházková, 2011a, d, f)
Results
Role of advanced risk engineering
Risk engineering ensures realisation of aims of 
risk management. The development of engineering 
types is shown in Fig. 8 (Procházková, 2011f). The 
key concepts of engineering directed to safety are:
1. The approaches are based on risk - the work intensity 
and documentation is adequate to the risk level.
2. The professional approach is based on reality 
that they are only considered critical attributes of 
quality and critical parameters of process.
3. The problem solution is oriented to critical items 
- they are followed and managed critical aspects 
of technical systems ensuring the consistence of 
system operations.
4. Verifi ed quality parameters are included in project 
proposal.
5. The accent on quality engineering procedures - it 
must prove the accuracy of selected procedures 
under given conditions.
6. The aim on safety upgrade - permanent improving 
the processes with the use of the analysis of root 
causes of malfunctions and failures.
From given facts it follows that engineering 
types given in Fig. 8 are multidisciplinary and 
interdisciplinary disciplines, and therefore, they use 
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various methods, tools and techniques. The safety 
engineering as very advanced risk engineering type 
respects the co-existence of systems with different 
nature (SoS), and so fulfi ls present demands of 
humans.  
Fig. 10 Engineering types
For the above given principles respect, relevant 
data sets and only verifi ed methods, that provide 
outputs with designated testifi ed competence, must 
be used. Because in a group of cases the vagueness 
in data is not well coped with, the procedures 
designated as good practice procedures/good 
engineering practice procedures are used. It goes on 
modus operandi procedures in individual domains 
that based on experience lead to a good result. 
The given procedure is used in cases in which any 
unifi ed procedure was not approved. It is often used 
at measurements in laboratories, negotiation with 
humans etc.
Good engineering practice (good engineering 
procedure) is then defi ned as a set of engineering 
methods and standards that are using during the 
life cycle of technical system with the aim to reach 
appropriate and cost-effi cient solution. It is supported 
by fi t documentation (conceptual documentation, 
diagrams, charts, manuals, testing reports etc.).
In a given context, the engineering expertise is 
the expression of capability to: apply knowledge 
of mathematics, science and engineering; propose 
and realize experiments; analyse and interpret data; 
propose components or whole system according 
to requirements and under the frame of realistic 
limitations identify, formulate and solve engineering 
problems; ensure the effective communication; 
comprehend impacts of engineering solutions in 
broader context; use the advanced tools and methods 
in engineering practice; adhere professional and 
operational responsibilities and ethics; lead the 
interdisciplinary team.  
The aim of risk engineering has been to reduce 
risks of considered systems. The risk is expressed 
as a probable size of losses, harms and detriments 
of followed assets that caused a given disaster with 
specifi ed size that is calculated for a certain time 
unit (usually 1 year) and a certain territory unit. At 
risk calculation, we distinguish whether the risk 
realisation develops forever identically or differently 
in dependence on momentary local and time asset 
conditions. In the fi rst case we determine a kind of 
mean risk value and its validity for use in practice 
we connect with condition that the less unfavourable 
case is considered (the given approach is in norms 
and standards based on deterministic approach). 
The other case corresponds to the reality better, and 
therefore it is considered at groundwork preparation 
for strategic management directed to safety. Are 
determined Variant scenarios of risk realisation 
and their occurrence probabilities are determined; 
from these the mean value and its dispersion is 
determined by clear mathematical procedure (the 
given approach is in norms and standards based on 
stochastic approach). The actual reality, however, 
is more complicated because, as stated above, the 
data have uncertainties and vagueness that connect 
with variability of conditions in time and space. At 
present, exactly defi ned heuristic procedures are 
used (Procházková, 2011b, 2012).
Problems that we must solve in a given 
context consist in obtaining the knowledge and 
in determination who is expert, see discussion in 
ESREL 2011 (Bérenguer, 2012).
What is necessary to improve?
Recent FOCUS project outputs (EU, 2012) 
show that the main EU problems, i.e. the EU 
vulnerabilities are the following: all hazard approach 
is not systemically applied; some disasters are 
underestimated; systemic, strategic and proactive 
management is not implemented into practice; gaps 
in risk management, risk engineering and in trade-
off with risks; research does not determine priority 
orientations, its targets are infl uenced by politicians 
or lobbies; application procedures and orientation 
of strategies are not regularly verifi ed; reasonable 
strategy for disaster management is missing; the 
disaster management does not often respect disaster 
life cycle; accent to problem solving is missing, 
still only a lot of discussions on problems; lack of 
resources; lack of instruments for ensuring the EU 
fi nance stability; lack of management supporting 
the public protection and sustainable development. 
In the frame of FOCUS project, the outputs will be 
proposals of measures and activities for removing 
the identifi ed defi ciencies.
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Conclusion
The concept respecting the above mentioned 
knowledge and approaches is the fundament on 
which the FOCUS project is performed. It gives 
the review of the present EU internal framework 
and the proposal of domains that are important 
for the EU internal framework upgrade with 
the aim to strengthen the EU role in the world in 
future. According to good practice principles, only 
systematic, permanent and well directed measures 
and activities guarantee the procuration of good EU 
role in the world now and in future. 
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